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Creating Chaos In The Name Of 
Consistency: Affirmative Action And 
The Odd Legacy Of Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 
Frank S. Ravitch* 
Introduction 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal is a strange decision. 
Civil rights advocates will likely express outrage at the inconsis-
tencies in logic and disregard for historical context that resonate 
throughout the majority opinion, concerns addressed by Justice 
Stevens in his poignant dissent.2 Over time, however, Adarand 
could become more problematic for those who support its reason-
ing and result than for civil rights advocates. For in its attempt to 
create clarity, Adarand has instead created anomalies within the 
tiered equal protection framework regarding both invidious 
discrimination and benign measures that benefit protected classes. 
This article explores the anomalies created when the conceptual 
framework developed in Adarand is considered in light of affirma-
tive action based on gender and disability. In addition, this article 
addresses the options that Adarand has left us in this regard. 
However, the Adarand decision is not solely responsible for 
creating this odd state of affairs. City of Richmond v. lA. Croson 
Co. 3 also contributed to the conceptual framework and set the 
stage for the anomalies discussed in this article. 
* Assistant Professor and Legal Studies Coordinator, University of Central Florida 
Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies. This article was originally presented as 
a paper at the 50th Annual Conference of the New York State Political Science Association 
in Ithaca, NY on March 30,1996. I would like to thank Oren Zeve, James Wooten, Marcus 
Dubber, Michael Meurer, Steven Halpern and Susan Behuniak for their valuable insights and 
support. I would also like to thank Charles Abernathy and Gary Gildin for their continued 
support and inspiration. 
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
2. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
3. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
281 
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The primary focus of this article is neither the inconsistencies 
presented by the Adarand decision,4 nor the fact that the opinion 
views benign race based measures in a completely ahistorical and 
decontextualized fashion.s Rather, this article looks at a potential-
ly bigger concern arising from the Adarand Court's quest for 
consistency. In the wake of Adarand and Croson different 
standards would seem applicable to benign measures based on 
race,6 gender' and disability.8 This difference in standards is 
likely to cause a great deal of confusion since these three classes 
4. However, these inconsistencies, particularly the Majority's failure to see the 
dichotomy between Congressional action enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and state 
action subject to it to the extent they are relevant to this article, will be discussed infra Parts 
I and II.D. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123·26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out this 
problem); Leading Cases: Affirmative Action-Federal Minority Preference Programs, 109 
HARV. L. REv. 111, 156-57 (1995). 
5. This same criticism has been eloquently discussed in regard to Croson. See Michel 
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Consti-
tutional Equality, 87 MIO:I. L. REv. 1729 (1989). It could be said that Adarand simply took 
the ahistorical, decontextualized approach utilized in Croson and applied it to Congressional 
action as well. 
6. Pursuant to Adarand and Croson, strict scrutiny is applicable to benign racial 
measures. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
7. Since Croson, many of the courts which have considered gender and race based 
programs have applied strict scrutiny to race while applying intermediate scrutiny to gender. 
See Concrete Works of Colorado v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 
1994) (applying strict scrutiny to racial aspects of program and intermediate scrutiny to 
gender aspects); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on 
remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996); Coral Const. Co. 
v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 
834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), affd mem., 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (pre-Croson case coming to 
the same conclusion); Associated Gen. Contr. of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco, 813 
F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Peter Lurie, Comment, The Law as They Found It: 
Disentangling Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs From Croson, 59 U. em. L. REv. 
1563 (1992) (specifically arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate mode of 
analysis for equal protection challenges to gender based programs after Croson); Cf. Cone 
Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying strict scrutiny to both 
gender and racial classifications, but reversing trial court's grant of summary judgement 
invalidating the law); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying strict 
scrutiny to gender and racial classifications); American Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of 
Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989). Significantly, the cases that have applied strict scrutiny to 
benign gender based programs do not explain why they do so. See Lurie, supra at 1582-83. 
However, courts which have looked at this issue in depth have generally applied intermediate 
scrutiny to gender classifications. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990; Coral Construction, 941 
F.2d 910; Michigan Road Builders, 834 F.2d 583; Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d 922. 
8. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (applying strict scrutiny to race, intermediate 
scrutiny to gender and rational basis to disability related aspects of a Philadelphia ordinance 
which provided for set-asides). 
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are . often the focus of the same kinds of affirmative action 
programs.9 
Significantly, several courts have already had to deal with 
programs that address both gender and race since Croson. to 
These courts have not agreed on how to apply Croson in deter-
mining the appropriate standard for gender based programs.ll 
Adding consideration of disability to this mix only increases the 
confusion. These concerns can lead to odd results, especially in 
light of this country's history of discriminationY 
This article proposes that Adarand essentially leaves four 
mutually exclusive options in regard to this situation. First, 
depending upon the class involved, three different standards would 
apply to benign programs. These three standards would make it 
harder to enact benign race based programs than programs based 
on gender, and harder still to enact benign gender based programs 
than those based on disability. This first option creates what I call 
a vertical anomaly, and it is this troubling anomaly Adarand seems 
to have wrought.13 
Second, all benign measures based on any protected classifica-
tion would receive strict scrutiny while leaving the current three 
tiered scheme in place in all other situations. This option would 
make it easier to enact laws that invidiously discriminate based on 
gender or disability than to enact laws which attempt to remedy the 
current effects of past discrimination against those classes. This 
second option, while solving the vertical anomaly created by option 
number one, creates what I term a horizontal anomaly.t4 
The third option would require all gender, disability and race 
based measures to receive strict scrutiny in regard to equal protec-
9. Id. 
10. See supra note 7 (listing cases which have dealt with both race-based and gender-
based programs). 
11. Id. 
12. For example, in Associated Gen. Contr., 813 F.2d 922, the court, using a strict 
scrutiny analysis, found the race based aspects of an affirmative action program designed to 
increase minority and female participation in city contracting unconstitutional. However, the 
gender based aspects of the program were found to be constitutional under the intermediate 
scrutiny test. See also Adorand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the 
anomalous result created by the application of strict scrutiny to benign race based measures 
in light of the differing levels of scrutiny applicable to other classes of individuals). 
13. See infra Part II.A. 
14. See infra Part II.B. 
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tion challenges.1s This option solves both the vertical and hori-
zontal anomalies. Given the current makeup of the Court, 
however, and considering the concerns raised over giving gender 
and disability suspect class status, this option may be difficult to 
achieve.16 
The fourth, and perhaps best option, is to recognize that 
Adarand was wrongly decided, and to apply a lower level of 
scrutiny to benign measures aimed at remedying the current effects 
of past discrimination.17 How realistic this option actually is, is 
difficult to ascertain given the current make up of the Court. 
However, as will be discussed below,18 the Adarand majority 
actually provides, in an attempt to justify its treatment of Metro 
Broadcasting v. FCC,19 the analytical framework which could be 
used to overturn its own opinion. . Of course, even if Adarand is 
overturned, Croson would still remain. Thus, at leas't with regard 
to state and local programs, the first three options would remain.20 
Moreover, I assert in this article that even if strict scrutiny 
were applied to benign class based measures, many such programs 
can survive that scrutiny in light of the language used to describe 
strict scrutiny in Adarand,21 and the cases applying similar lan-
15. This option has been proposed for gender and race in light of Croson. See John 
Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny For Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L REv. 508 (1993). An 
opposite proposal also exists. See Lurie, supra note 7 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny 
is still applicable to gender claims after Croson). The reasoning and the rationale behind 
each of these proposals differ. 
16. See infra Part II.C. 
17. Another appealing possibility would be to take affirmative action programs subject 
to constitutional standards out of the traditional three tiered analytical framework applied 
in equal protection cases and apply a different standard to them. See infra Part 11.0. See 
also HoUy Dyer, Comment, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in the Tiered 
Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny? 41 KAN. L REv. 591, 612-13 (1993) (suggesting that 
Justice Stevens has already laid the groundwork for such a standard in his opinions which 
often express distaste for the three tiered standards, and setting forth a test grounded in his 
opinions). 
18. See infra Part 11.0. 
19. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
20. The court might also overturn Croson. However, to the extent that the bases for 
doing so are different than those for overturning Adarand, they are beyond the scope of this 
article. Significantly, however, Adarand itself overturned the earlier precedent Metro 
Broadcasting and at least aspects of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See 
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2113 (these decisions were overturned to the extent they do not 
comport with Adarand). 
21. In Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117, the majority asserts: 
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.' (citation omitted). The unhappy persistence of both the practical 
HeinOnline -- 101 Dick. L. Rev. 285 1996-1997
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUcrORS 285 
guage in Croson to affirmative action programs.22 The real issue 
lies in meeting the necessary evidentiary burden, and not in the 
feasibility of such programs in general.23 Thus, while Congress 
and local governments may have to go to great expense to jump 
through the evidentiary hoops that the Court now requires in order 
to justify beneficial programs (which could actually be supported by 
less costly yet quite probative evidence),24 such programs can 
indeed survive strict scrutiny when the proper requirements are 
met. 
Part I of this article discusses the Adarand decision in light of 
several earlier decisions considering the appropriate analytical 
framework for constitutional challenges to affirmative action 
programs. Part II addresses the four possible results of Adarand in 
regard to the appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny for race, 
gender and disability and suggests that the third and fourth options 
mentioned above are the most appropriate possibilities.25 This 
Part also introduces the concepts of horizontal and vertical 
Id. 
and lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country 
is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in 
response to it. 
22. Several cases utilizing the strict scrutiny test set forth in Croson have addressed the 
circumstances under which state and local race based affirmative action programs can be 
constitutional. See, e.g., Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1008 
(holding that the city of Philadelphia presented sufficient evidence to survive summary 
judgement in regard to race based program but ultimately affirming order on remand after 
bench trial enjoining race based program under strict scrutiny standard); Cone Corp., 908 
F.2d at 916 (holding that Hillsborough County presented sufficient evidence on the question 
of prior discrimination and the need for racial classification to justify denial of summary 
judgement). 
23. After Croson, courts and commentators alike have agreed upon the importance of 
meeting the necessary evidentiary burden. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001-09 
(reversing order granting summary judgement against Philadelphia in regard to race based 
aspects of set-aside program after engaging in an in-depth analysis of the evidence presented 
by the city to justify the program in light of the evidentiary burden set forth in Croson); 
Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 913-16 (stating that Croson did not preclude local governments from 
enacting race based affirmative action programs, but rather established a "stringent burden 
of proof for proponents of MBE laws to meet" and holding that the evidence presented by 
the government entity involved was sufficient to withstand summary judgement). See also 
Joint Statement: Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711,1712 (1989) ("The Supreme Court has 
insisted that affirmative action programs be carefully designed-not dismantled. H). 
24. This observation will, be discussed further. See infra Part III. Unfortunately the 
ability to compile evidence to meet the evidentiary burden may not convince government 
entities that it is worth the expense. 
25. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
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anomaly, asserting that one or the other will occur unless options 
three or four are utilized. Part III draws a connection between 
judicial scrutiny of state and local affirmative action programs after 
Croson and the likely result in regard to federal programs after 
Adarand. Finally, Part III, concludes that such programs can 
indeed survive strict scrutiny as it is described in both Croson and 
Adarand. 
Ultimately, this article proposes that the most viable option is 
to overturn Adarand; an option which the decision's own language, 
as well as it's inconsistencies would strongly support. By overturn-
ing Adarand, the vertical and horizontal anomalies potentially 
created by the Court's approach could be eliminated. The other 
option this Article suggests as palatable would be to apply Adarand 
to gender and disability based affirmative action programs, thus 
subjecting invidious measures aimed at those classes to strict 
scrutiny (which is generally fatal),26 while subjecting benign mea-
sures based on those classifications to a version of strict scrutiny 
that might not be fatal if the enacting body can meet the necessary 
evidentiary burden.27 
I. The Adarand Decision 
Before addressing the issues raised in Parts II and III of this 
Article, it is essential to discuss the Adarand case itself and some 
of the concerns caused by its reasoning. In Adarand, the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to a benign race based 
program created by Congress.28 Until Adarand, the Court had not 
yet applied strict scrutiny to such a federal program. In fact, in 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,29 the most recent decision to 
address the issue at the time Adarand was decided, a majority of 
the Court applied a more lenient standard to the benign race based 
program promulgated by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.30 
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that intermediate 
scrutiny applied to benign race based measures, and required that 
26. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that after Adarand 
strict scrutiny analysis of invidious discrimination is still likely to be fatal, while benign 
measures can survive under proper circumstances). 
27. Id. at 2117. 
28. Id. 
29. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
30. Id. 
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such programs be substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective.31 Likewise, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,32 a case 
decided ten years prior to Metro Broadcasting, a plurality of the 
Justices had applied an amorphous, but potentially more lenient 
standard than strict scrutiny,33 to a program very similar to the 
one involved in Adarand.34 
Between Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, the Court decided 
City of Richmond v. lA. Croson CO.35 Croson applied strict 
scrutiny review to a benign race-based program enacted by a local 
government, and ultimately found the program unconstitutiona1.36 
However, Croson did not present a federal affirmative action 
program; rather, the program attacked had been enacted by a local 
government.37 Indeed, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, 
and Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion, both acknowledged that 
Congress has a specific mandate to enforce the dictates of the 
31. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65. 
32. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
33. In Fullilove, the plurality did not directly apply any of the three levels of scrutiny 
commonly used in equal protection analysis. Instead, the court looked to "whether the 
objectives of the legislation are within the power of Congress" and to whether the use "of 
racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally pennissible means for 
achieving the Congressional objectives." Id. at 473 (emphasis in the original). Justice 
Powell, in his concurrence, stated his belief that the plurality opinion was generally in accord 
with his view that strict scrutiny should apply to racial classifications. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., 
concurring). However, the opinion has been interpreted to provide a more lenient standard 
than strict scrutiny because a majority of the court in Fullilove did not apply strict scrutiny. 
See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-66. See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472, 492; id. at 
519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgement) (Marshall's concurrence, which applied 
intermediate scrutiny to the program, was joined by two other Justices). 
34. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448; but see id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that he 
believed the opinion should have placed greater emphasis on the articulation of a standard 
to review such claims, but despite that fact the plurality opinion was generally in accord with 
his view that strict scrutiny should apply to all race based classifications). The Fullilove 
plurality upheld a program that was strikingly similar to the one at issue in Adarand. In fact, 
in his dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice Souter stated that Fullilove should have 
controlled the constitutionality of the programs at question in Adarand, which seemed better 
tailored than the programs at issue in Fullilove. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131-34 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). Justice Souter also seemed to question the wisdom of even considering the 
scrutiny standard issue, since he understood the appropriate issue on appeal to be whether 
a federal agency needs to make specific findings of discrimination before it could "exceed 
the goals adopted by Congress in implementing a race-based remedial program." Id. at 2131. 
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 491. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, whereas state conduct is specifically 
subject to that Amendment?8 
This position is consistent with that presented by the Fullilove 
plurality39 and the Metro Broadcasting majority40-a fact not lost 
on Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Adarand.41 It is 
against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Adarand. 
However, the Court inexplicably held in Adarand that Congres-
sional action aimed at remedying the effects of past discrimination 
in the several states should be analyzed under the same standard 
as state action, using strict scrutiny.42 To the extent that Metro 
Broadcasting and Fullilove are inconsistent with Adarand, the 
Supreme Court overruled those decisions.43 
The Adarand majority, including Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 
seemingly ignored their earlier position, providing no justification 
beyond a new analytical approach which embraced the concepts of 
38. In Croson, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
Congress, unlike any state or political subdivision, has a specific consti-
tutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which 
Congress detennines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic 
rules to deal with those situations. The Civil War Amendments themselves 
worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state powers 
over matters of race. 
Id. at 490. Similarly, Justice Scalia wrote: 
[I]t is one thing to permit racially based conduct by the Federal Govern-
ment-whose legislative powers concerning matters of race were explicitly 
enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment, See U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 5-and 
quite another to permit it by the precise entities against whose conduct in matters 
of race that Amendment was specifically directed. See Amdt. 14, § 1. 
Id. at 521-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
39. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. 
40. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563. 
41. Adorand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 2097. 
43. Id. at 2113, 2117. 
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skepticism, congruence and consistency.44 The majority relies 
heavily upon these three concepts in justifying its decision.45 
In short, as envisioned by the Adarand majority, skepticism 
refers to the idea that race based preferences should receive a 
44. Jd.; Jd. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the practical implication 
of this approach, see infra Part 11.0. Justice O'Connor denies that this is a change of 
position, stating: 
It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of the 
authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with 
the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer 
to Congress' exercise of that authority ... (citations omitted) ... We need not, 
and do not, address these differences today. For now, it is enough to observe that 
Justice Stevens' suggestion that any Member of this Court has repudiated his or 
her previously expressed views on the subject, post, at 2123-2125, 2127, is 
incorrect. 
Adaranti, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. 
However, it is hard to believe, given the language cited supra note 38, and the 
language in Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, that Adarand does not represent a significant 
change of position by several Justices and the Court as a whole. To say that an opinion 
addressing the issue of the constitutionality of benign race-based measures created by the 
federal government and enforceable in the states, need not address Congress' special power 
to deal with racial issues and enforce the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is shocking. 
It is possible the majority means to imply that deference to Congress in this regard 
should be a factor considered in strict scrutiny analysis of such programs. However, this 
would result in a tiered version of strict scrutiny, and Adarand will have doubly confused an 
already confusing area of law. It would also be a hollow deference paid to Congress' special 
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because any 
concept of strict scrutiny does not seem to fit well with special deference to the Legislature. 
45. Adaranti, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. These three concepts are grounded in the principle that 
the promise of equal protection contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects 
individuals, not groups. As Justice O'Connor writes: 
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all derive from 
the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
protect persons, not groups. It follows from that principle that all governmental 
action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in "most circum-
stances irrelevant and therefore prOhibited," Hirabayashi, supra, at 100, 63 S. Ct. 
at 13~hould be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the 
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed. These ideas 
have long been central to this Court's understanding of equal protection, and 
holding "benign" state and federal racial classification to different standards does 
not square with them. 
Jd. at 2112-13 (emphasis added in the original). This method of reasoning leads the majority 
directly to the conclusion that, in a free society based on the doctrine of equality, strict 
scrutiny should apply to all race-based measures because government may treat people 
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons. Jd. Significantly, 
however, the majority cites nothing in support of the idea that strict scrutiny is the only level 
of scrutiny consistent with these principles in the context of benign measures created by 
Congress in response to the effects of discrimination aimed at particular racial classifications. 
Jd. 
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searching examination.46 Consistency refers to the idea that the 
standard to be applied to race based classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause should not depend on the race of those effected 
by the classification.47 Congruence refers to the idea that equal 
protection analysis of federal action under the Fifth Amendment 
should be the same as that applied to state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.48 
Essentially, the concepts of skepticism and consistency amount 
to a "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" philosophy. 
In other words, race based classifications should be viewed 
skeptically and consistently regardless of whether it is the majority 
or a minority which is burdened by the classification and regardless 
of the historical context from which that classification arose. Under 
this approach, if you cannot have a preference which favors the 
majority, you cannot have one that favors the minority unless you 
subject it to the same standard.49 
Congruence is a similarly simplistic concept. If the states are 
held to a particular standard under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of congruence requires 
that the federal government be held to no less of a standard under 
the Fifth Amendment.50 At first glance, this result seems to be 
supported by simple logic. Any other result would suggest that the 
federal government be able to discriminate more than the states.51 
But for the unfortunate fact that the majority's idea of congru-
ence ignores the difference between Congress' power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the states' role as subservient to that 
Amendment,52 as well as some of the explanatory language of the 
Justices themselves,53 the Court's theory of congruence might be 
a persuasive one. However, the majority fails to recognize the fact 
that its opinion compares apples and oranges. Arguably Congress 
should be no more able to perpetuate invidious discrimination than 
a state would be,54 but it cannot be ignored that, in passing benign 
46. ld. at 2111. 
47. ld. 
48. ld. 
49. ld. at 2111-13. 
50. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. 
51. ld. at 2113, 2115. 
52. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
53. ld. 
54. Justice Stevens addresses this concern in his dissenting opinion, but explains why 
there is no conflict with Congress' receiving greater deference than a state government when 
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race based measures applicable to the states, Congress is acting to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; an act that Congress is 
specifically empowered to perform.55 
The majority accounts for this argument in part with the other 
two principles- skepticism and consistency. The Court argues that 
one cannot know whether a measure is truly invidious or benign 
without subjecting it to the most exacting of scrutiny.56 Implicitly 
then, when Congress passes an apparently remedial race-based 
measure, one cannot know whether Congress is acting to discrimi-
nate or simply to enforce its power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Only by subjecting the measure to strict scrutiny, and thus 
a higher evidentiary burden, can a determination be made as to the 
validity of Congressional action.57 
Of course application of these two principles creates an odd 
situation: in order to determine whether remedial action by 
it enacts a benign race-based program: 
Presumably, the majority is now satisfied that its theory of "congruence" 
between the substantive rights provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
disposes of the objection based on divided constitutional powers. But it is one 
thing to say (as no one seems to dispute) that the Fifth Amendment encompasses 
a general guarantee of equal protection as broad as that contained within the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is another thing entirely to say that Congress' 
institutional competence and constitutional authority entitles it to no greater 
deference when it enacts a program designed to foster equality than the deference 
due a state legislature. The latter is an extraordinary proposition; and, as the 
foregoing discussion demonstrates, our precedents have rejected it explicitly and 
repeatedly. 
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
55. [d.. Justice Stevens writes a few pages later: 
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same time 
it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It represents our Nation's 
consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry history of race 
relations, that the Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial 
minorities against the States, some of which may be inclined to oppress such 
minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ignores a purposeful "incongruity" so 
fundamental to our system of government is unacceptable. 
In my judgement, the Court's novel doctrine of "congruence" is seriously 
misguided. Congressional deliberations about a matter as important as affirmative 
action should be accorded far greater deference than those of a State or munici-
pality. 
[d.. at 2126 (footnotes omitted). Significantly, if the basis for the court's approach is the lack 
of clarity regarding whether Congress is acting pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments when it passes benign measures applicable in the states, context would seem to 
provide an answer. Of course, if this were really the issue, Congress could simply state in 
the legislation that it is acting pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
56. [d.. at 2113-14. 
57. [d.. 
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Congress is proper it must be subject to the same strict scrutiny 
standard as the invidious discrimination that it was meant to 
remedy. Thus, Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment is treated the same as state action subject to that 
amendment and Congress' own duty not to violate the Fifth 
Amendment.58 
Congruence aside,59 the other two concepts appear, at least 
at first glance, to make sense. After all, why should one or two 
racial groups have an advantage in an equal, color-blind society? 
The simple answer is that our society is neither equal nor color-
blind.60 Beyond that reality, however, to treat legislation aimed 
at remedying the effects of past or present discrimination directed 
at racial minorities and legislation meant to discriminate against 
those minorities as the same, one must completely divorce· the 
legislation from its historical context and tum the debate into an 
ahistorical analysis of racial categorization.61 In fact, one must 
58. Id. at 2123-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
59. This concept of congruence will be discussed in greater depth. See infra Part 11.0. 
60. Studies, many of which have been done by the Urban Institute, demonstrate the 
differential treatment accorded minority and white candidates for the same jobs, houses, etc. 
They are compelling and suggest that we do not yet live in an equal or colorblind society. 
See e.g., Margery A. Turner, et al., Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished: Racial 
Discrimination in Hiring IX, URBAN INST. REp. (1991) (overall, white job applicants fared 
better in the hiring process than equally qualified black applicants who applied for the same 
job); Margery A. Turner, et aI., Housing and Urban Development, Housing Discrimination 
Study: Synthesis VI (Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. 1991) (more than fifty percent of black 
and hispanic subjects seeking to buy or rent a home were treated less favorably than paired 
white subjects); Peter J. Leahy, Are Racial Factors Important for the Allocation of Mortgage 
Money?,44 AM. J. EeON. & Soc. 185 (1985) (study controlling for socioeconomic factors 
between neighborhoods which were similar in all major mortgage-lending criterion except 
for race, and finding that mortgage lending outcomes are unequal). Additionally, legal 
scholars using social science data to support their conclusions have recognized that our 
society is not yet colorblind. See, e.g. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Kimberle 
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, And Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
61. In her dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice Ginsburg aptly sums up this point with 
a quote from Steven L. Carter: 
[W]hatever the source of racism, to count it the same as racialism, to say 
that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been mostly 
about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial 
oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism. To pretend ... that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the 
issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present 
doesn't exist. 
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2138 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen L. Carter, When 
Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988). 
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substantively ignore the history of this nation; an odd approach to 
issues that arise precisely because of that history.62 This is the 
primary concern raised by the concept of consistency as augmented 
by the concept of skepticism. 
Of course, that is not to say that the concept of skepticism 
standing alone must be used in an ahistorical fashion. As Justice 
O'Connor points out in the majority decision, any government 
developed race based classification should be viewed skeptically 
because of the dangers inherent in treating people differently based 
on race.63 In fact, the concept of skepticism towards racial classifi-
cations, well established in Supreme Court precedent,64 can be 
applied consistently not only with strict scrutiny,65 but also with 
more lenient standards of equal protection review.66 Standing 
alone, skepticism is not a concept that necessarily requires benign 
62. It is particularly interesting that in his concurrence, Justice Thomas states: 
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this 
program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses 
our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness"). 
Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement). Thomas's use 
of this quote epitomizes the Court's ahistorical approach. The words of the Declaration of 
Independence make perfect sense and seem to embrace a certain universality. However, the 
same Constitution to which Justice Thomas refers recognized slavery as legal and counted 
African-Americans as three fifths of a person. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2(3). Until thirty years 
ago the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, permitted the continued existence of 
segregation and the separate but equal doctrine. Lofty principles sound wonderful as 
universal rules when divorced from their historical contexts. However, placed in that 
context, benign race based measures would appear necessary to make the universal 
application of those principles a reality. 
63. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13. 
64. Id. at 2111. 
65. See id. (applying the concept of skepticism with strict scrutiny). 
66. Skepticism of race-based classifications does not, by itself, mandate strict scrutiny. 
One can be skeptical and apply a lower standard, such as intermediate scrutiny, to benign 
measures because they are justified both by this nation's sad history of race relations and 
Congress' enumerated powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Metro 
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547; Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Skepticism 
would be healthy in this context because it would keep courts on guard as they apply the 
standard. Skepticism is already embodied in the application of the heightened scrutiny 
inherent in the intermediate level standard. In fact, one could tum the Adarand opinion on 
its head-instead of using strict scrutiny to determine what measures are benign or invidious 
(and watering it down in some contexts) courts could apply rational basis scrutiny with 
skepticism to apparently benign measures, thereby requiring a court to ask whether the 
legislature's motives were invidious or benign. If benign, rational basis scrutiny would apply; 
strict scrutiny would apply if the motivation was invidious. 
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measures to be treated in the same fashion as invidious ones.67 
Skepticism is by far, the least troubling aspect of the tripartite 
conceptual framework proposed by the Adarand Court; at least 
until it is plugged into the other two concepts of consistency and 
congruence. 
A major force underlying the majority approach in Adarand is 
the need for clarity in an area of law fraught with confusion.68 On 
its face, the majority decision would seem to provide this clarity.69 
However, Adarand, along with Croson, has created a new kind of 
confusion; confusion which has far greater practical implications 
than the confusion the Adarand majority sought to clear up. For, 
in applying its strict· scrutiny standard based on the concepts of 
skepticism, consistency and congruence, the Adarand majority does 
not address. the level of scrutiny to be accorded benign measures 
based on gender and disability'?o Similarly, Croson does not deal 
with these concems.71 
Since affirmative action programs often involve gender and 
disability in addition to race, the Adarand decision has created 
serious anomalies in the tiered equal protection framework.72 The 
remainder of this article is devoted to addressing what options the 
Court has left us in regard to this situation, which of these options 
are appropriate and why. The foregoing discussion of Adarand and 
its predecessors provides the background against which this 
discussion must take place. 
67. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120. 
68. [d.; See also itt. at 2120-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority glosses 
over real differences between benign and invidious measures in an attempt to promote its 
concept of "conSistency"). 
69. As Part I and III of this Article point out, however, this "clarity" has come at a high 
price. Moreover, the clarity purportedly offered in Adarand might not be any more clear 
in application than the previous standards. A large portion of the remainder of this article 
is devoted to assessing the new confusion created in the Adarand majority's quest for clarity. 
70. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. 
71. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
72. See infra Part II. 
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II. The Practical Legacy Of Adarand And Croson: What To 
Do About Gender And Disability In Light Of The "New" 
Treatment Of Race 
Neither Adarand nor Croson dealt with the appropriate 
standard for addressing benign gender or disability based pro-
grams.73 In those cases, the court applied strict scrutiny to benign 
racial classifications because strict scrutiny was applicable to 
invidious racial classifications,14 without providing an explanation 
as to the impact of those decisions on gender and disability based 
classifications subject to lower levels of equal protection scrutiny.7S 
Adarand in particular utilized the terms "skepticism" and "consis-
tency. ,,76 As noted above, together these two concepts require 
that the same level of equal protection scrutiny be applied to all 
racial classifications whether benign or invidious.77 
This overall approach creates a problem. Many affirmative 
action programs involve race, gender and disability.78 Since 
invidious classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny,19 and those based on disability are generally subject to 
rational basis scrutiny,80 it appears that Adarand has created what 
amounts to a tiered approach to affirmative action based on its 
73. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; [d. 
at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. 469; T. Alexander Alienkoff, A Case for 
Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060,1095 n.l68 (1991) (recognizing confusion over 
gender based classifications following Croson: "[i]f in following Croson, all lines drawn on 
the basis of gender will be judged by the same standard, then gender based affirmative action 
programs, which have been subjected to mid-level scrutiny, would seemingly be subjected to 
a lower level scrutiny than race-based plans. This conundrum cannot go unaddressed"). 
74. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
75. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on 
remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to benign gender classification and rational basis scrutiny to a similar 
disability based classification). 
76. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. 
77. See supra Part I. 
78. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (reviewing a Philadelphia set aside ordinance 
applying to race, gender and disability); GEORGE STEPHANOPOLIS & CHRISTOPHER EOLEY, 
JR., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 76-80 (July 19, 1995) 
(noting that several programs of the Department of Education and Health and Human 
Services "are targeted on the basis of race, gender or disability"). 
79. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001; 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 942 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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reliance on the concept of "consistency."s1 Justice Stevens noted 
this concern, at least in regard to gender, in his dissent when he 
wrote: 
[T]he court may find that its new "consistency" approach to 
race-based classifications is difficult to square with its insistence 
upon rigidly separate categories for discrimination against 
different classes of individuals. For example, as the law 
currently stands, the Court will apply "intermediate scrutiny" to 
cases of invidious gender discrimination and "strict scrutiny" to 
cases of invidious race discrimination, while applying the same 
standard for benign classifications as invidious ones. If this 
remains the law, then today's lecture about "consistency" will 
produce the anomalous result that the government can more 
easily enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimina-
tion against women than it can enact affirmative action pro-
grams to remedy discrimination against African-Americans-
even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves. 
(citation omitted). When a court becomes preoccupied with 
abstract standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the alter 
of formal consistency.82 
Courts have already had to grapple with this concern under 
Croson,83 and Adarand significantly compounds the problem.84 
So what options does Adarand leave us to resolve this significant 
confusion created by the Court's quest for "consistency"? 
This article asserts that Adarand leaves only four possibilities: 
(1) subject benign measures based on race, gender and disability to 
different standards of equal protection review, thus making it 
harder to enact benign race based programs than to enact programs 
based on gender and disability;85 (2) require that all benign 
measures based on any protected classification be subject to strict 
81. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. 
82. [d. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
84. The federal government has created affirmative action programs based on race, 
gender and disability. See STEPHAN OPOLIS & EDLEY, supra note 78 at 76-80 (noting several 
social programs administered by the Departments of Education and Health and Human 
Services); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. I-V) (requiring 
affirmative action regarding handicapped individuals in federal agencies and those 
contracting with federal agencies and departments). Thus, in the wake of Adarand, courts 
reviewing programs that involve classifications other than race, gender and disability will 
encounter great confusion as to the appropriate applicable standards. 
85. See infra Part II.A. 
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scrutiny while maintaining the current three tiered scheme for all 
other situations, thus making it easier to enact laws which invidi-
ously discriminate based on gender and disability than to enact laws 
meant to remedy the effects of discrimination;86 (3) subject all 
classifications based on race, gender and disability to strict scrutiny, 
thus requiring that both invidious and benign measures based on 
gender and disability be subject to strict scrutiny;87 or, (4) overturn 
Adarand (and possibly Croson), applying instead a lower level of 
scrutiny to those benign measures created to remedy the effects of 
discrimination as was done in Metro Broadcasting,88 or undo the 
three tiered equal protection scrutiny scheme in regard to benign 
measures and adopt some new approach.89 
In the pages that follow each of these options is discussed. 
Ultimately I will explain why options three and four provide the 
best alternatives. In discussing these options, I will also explain 
what I have termed "the vertical anomalies" created by option 
one90 and the "horizontal anomaly" created by option twO.91 In 
reading the discussion that follows, it is important to consider that 
"strict scrutiny," as characterized in Adarand,92 is not necessarily 
fatal to affirmative action programs.93 I will explore this idea in 
greater detail in Part 111.94 
A. The First Option: Maintaining the Current Three Tiered 
System and the Creation of Vertical Anomalies 
The first option left in the wake of Adarand in regard to 
gender and disability based affirmative action is to maintain the 
integrity of the three tiered equal protection scrutiny system.95 
This would result in tiered affirmative action.96 The concept of 
"consistency" as set forth in Adarand would require that both 
86. See infra Part II.B. 
87. See infra Part II.C. 
88. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
89. See infra Part 11.0. See also supra note 17 and sources cited therein. 
90. See infra Part II.A. . 
91. See infra Part II.B. 
92. Adarand, 115 S. Q. at 2117; Id. at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 2117. See also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
94. See infra Part III. 
95. I do not mean to imply that the Adarand decision specifically addressed gender or 
disability based affirmative action. It did not. Adarand, 115 S. Q. 2097. However, the 
opinion did create an apparent anomaly in regard to affirmative action aimed at helping 
classes other than race. 
96. See infra Figures 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
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invidious and benign measures be accorded the same treatment 
within each tier of the equal protection scheme.97 This is the 
logical result of the "what's good for the goose is good for the 
gander" approach spelled out in Adarand.98 However, as has 
been suggested in regard to Croson,99 this creates an anomaly.1°O 
This anomaly, which I term a "vertical anomaly" is represented by 
Figure 1. 
97. Of course, the Adarand majority would likely say that one must apply strict scrutiny 
to detennine whether a measure is benign or invidious in the first place. Adarand, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2113. However, when strict scrutiny is viewed in the tiered system such a requirement 
makes no sense. If one "must" subject a measure to strict scrutiny to determine its purpose, 
then how can a gender based program ever be properly analyzed within the current tiered 
system given the concept of "consistency?" Or would it be adequate to simply accept a 
legislature's description of a program as benign under intennediate scrutiny? If so, the 
problems addressed infra at notes 100-04, arise. Additionally, if after Adarand, Congress' 
stated purpose for legislation (i.e. benign race-based measures) is not to be accepted absent 
strict scrutiny, the problem of giving proper deference to Congress' power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment under § 5 of that Amendment arises. See supra notes 50-55 and 
accompanying text. The additional concern that benign measures will be struck down in the 
process of detennining whether they are benign unless they meet an extremely high 
evidentiary burden also arises. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
98. Adarand, 115 S. O. at 2111. It is possible that "consistency" was meant only to 
apply to race. However, this makes little sense.in light of how the concept is presented in 
Adarand. If the race of those benefitted by a program should not determine the level of 
scrutiny, neither should the gender or disability status of those similarly benefitted or 
burdened. Otherwise, the vertical anomaly will be even more pronounced. If this were not 
the case, then the horizontal anomaly discussed infra Part II.B. might occur. 
99. Alienkoff, supra note 73, at 1095 n.l68; infra note 170 and accompanying text; see 
also Adarand, 115 S. O. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning Adarand causes the 
same problem in regard to federal programs). 
100. The fact that the Court has created an anomaly or inconsistency does not mean that 
the Court will necessarily see fit to remedy the situation. However, as is explained in this 
Part, the anomalies created by Adarand when gender and disability based affinnative action 
are considered are quite severe, and ultimately it is likely that the Court will be forced to 
deal with them. 
Additionally, someone siding with the position taken by Justice Scalia in Adarand, 
might argue that no anomaly is presented by this situation since government can never have 
a compelling reason to discriminate on the basis of race to make up for past discrimination. 
Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia J., concurring). Therefore, the fact that gender and disability based 
affinnative action are subject to lower standards than race based affinnative action does not 
create an anomaly since race based affinnative action is always unacceptable. However, this 
is more an argument against affinnative action, or at least against race based affirmative 
action, than it is an argument against the existence of vertical anomaly. If as Adarand 
specifically states, race based affinnative action is viable in appropriate circumstances, then 
the anomalies discussed in this article do exist. Id. at 2117. If not, then the anomaly is even 
greater because while there can be no race based affinnative action, there could be 
affinnative action for classes which receive less protection from invidious discrimination. See 
infra Figure 2 and accompanying text. . 
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FIGURE 1 
Essentially, this anomaly means that it will be much harder to 
enact race-based affirmative action than to enact gender based 
affirmative action,101 and harder still to enact race based affirma-
tive action than to enact disability based affirmative action.102 
While all of these groups have suffered severe discrimination in this 
nation/OJ it seems odd that, under the Equal Protection Clause, 
it would be harder to take affirmative action to remedy the effects 
of racial discrimination. This is especially troubling considering 
that the Equal Protection Clause was initially created as a means 
to end discrimination against the slaves,104 and that affirmative 
action was first adopted primarily to help African-Americans.105 
Moreover, making the enactment of race based affirmative 
action programs the most difficult does not seem to fit well when 
one considers the reasons these classifications are situated as they 
are within the relevant tiers of scrutiny. Under traditional equal 
101. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097. 
102. 102. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990 (applying the rational basis test to the disability 
based portion of a program, while applying strict scrutiny to the race based portion). 
103. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (recognizing discrimination based on race); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (recognizing discrimination based on gender); 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990) (recognizing discrimination based 
on disability). 
104. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
105. The concept of affinnative action first appeared officially in executive orders issued 
in the 1960s as part of anti-discrimination measures dealing with race, creed, color and 
national origin in the arena of government contracts. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 
448 (1959-63); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Sept. 24, 1965). IrOnically, invidious 
discrimination aimed at all of the groups (i.e. race, creed, color and national origin) 
mentioned in these early affinnative action attempts currently receives strict scrutiny. Yet, 
under Adarand, federal affinnative action aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination 
towards these groups continues to be scrutinized the most. 
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protection analysis, race is considered a suspect class, and thus 
receives the highest level of scrutiny.1OO Gender, however, is 
considered a quasi-suspect class, and thus receives more protection 
than most classifications but less than race. This is because gender 
can be relevant in some, though very few, circumstances.1oo 
According to the Supreme Court, disability is not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class and thus it receives far less protection under the 
Equal Protection Clause.1OS Whether or not the status of disabil-
ity as a suspect or quasi-suspect class might change in light of the 
passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act,t09 will be dis-
cussed later in this article.110 
Since as among race, gender, and disability, race is the class 
entitled to the greatest protection from discrimination, it would 
seem logical that measures aimed at remedying the effects of racial 
discrimination would be given the greatest latitude. Yet, the 
vertical anomaly created by AdarandlCroson makes it harder to 
engage in affirmative action to remedy race discrimination, even 
though under the Equal Protection Clause, that type of discri-
mination is considered the most pernicious kind.111 
Essentially, the Court's concept of "consistency" can work 
within a tier. However, when that tier is placed on the road with 
the other tiers and with the groups falling within them, it is not 
logical that it be a two way street. When dealing with invidious 
discrimination the tiers make some sense; race has a unique history 
in this nation and is virtually never a relevant factor for legislative 
purposes,112 while disability and gender can be relevant under 
some circumstances.ll3 Thus, there is justification for making it 
106. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985). Galotto, supra note 15, at 518-22. 
108. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432. 
109. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101·12213 (1990). 
110. See infra Part II.C. 
111. That racial discrimination is the most pernicious kind of discrimination is inherent 
in the history of applying strict scrutiny to invidious racial classifications. Adarand, 115 S. 
a. at 2106-08. ld. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that it is anomalous to make 
it harder to remedy discrimination against African Americans through affirmative action 
plans since the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to avoid discrimination 
against the former slaves). 
112. ld. at 2112-13. See also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
113. For example, consider a statute requiring separate restroom facilities for men and 
women or a law requiring that one be able to see in order to drive. See Galotto, supra note 
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harder to discriminate on the basis of race. Since however, the 
purpose of affirmative action is to help remedy the effects of past 
discrimination, it makes no sense to make it harder to enact 
programs meant to remedy the effects of racial discrimination than 
to enact programs aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination 
against classifications which are entitled to less protection in regard 
. to invidious discrimination.114 Figure 2 depicts this conundrum: 
Race 
(Strict Scrutiny) 
Gender 
(Intermediate Scrutiny) 
Disability 
(Rational Basis Scrutiny) 
More Protection From 
Invidious Discrimination 
Harder to Enact 
Remedial Legislation 
t Invidious <------------------> Benign 
I consistency 
I Invidious <---------> Benign 
I consistency 
I Invidious <--------------> Benign I 
.j. I consistency 
Less Protection From 
Invidious Discrimination 
FIGURE 2 
Easier to Enact 
Remedial Legislation 
After Croson, several courts have had to deal with these 
concerns in regard to local government programs. The results are 
a mixed bag which demonstrate the effects of vertical anomaly in 
action. 
In Contractors Association v. City of Philadelphia,115 the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a Philadelphia program 
which established set-asides on the basis of race, gender and 
disability. 116 The district court had invalidated the ordinance in 
regard to all of the classes covered. ll7 In the light of the decision 
in Croson, which required that strict scrutiny be applied to all race-
based programs created by state and local governments,118 the 
court of appeals applied strict scrutiny to the race based aspects of 
the program. 119 
IS, at 518 (setting forth the restroom example in the context of a discussion about the 
Court's treatment of gender discrimination under the equal protection doctrine). 
, 114. This is likely why Justice Stevens referred to this situation in regard to gender and 
race as an anomaly. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115. 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1990), on remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 
F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996). 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 993. 
118. Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
119. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1000. 
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Citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan;'2JJ which 
had held a gender based classification favoring women to that 
standard, the court then applied intermediate scrutiny to the gender 
based aspects of the program.121 The court also held that based 
on Croson it was logical to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender 
classifications since Croson had applied the same standard to 
benign race based programs as to other racial classifications. 122 
The Third Circuit thus implied that the concept of "consistency" 
was inherent in Croson and applicable to gender. 
Rational basis scrutiny was applied to the disability based 
aspects of the programl23 under the standards set forth in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 124 The court rejected the 
argument that the Americans With Disabilities Actl25 altered 
Cleburne. In so ruling, the court cited only to a footnote in More 
v. Farrier, 126 a case providing only a cursory explanation as to 
why the ADA could not serve as a basis to alter the level of 
scrutiny applicable to disability.l21 The court's cursory treatment 
of this argument is a bit puzzling in light of Congressional language 
contained in the ADA which declares disabled individuals to be a 
"discreet and insular minority," and explains that disabled indi-
viduals have been subject to a history of discrimination based on 
immutable characteristics.l28 These considerations are all relevant 
to the determination of suspect classification.129 
Ultimately, the Third Circuit in Contractors Association had to 
apply three different tests to the same program to assess the 
program's constitutionality as it applied to the three different 
classes.l30 In doing so, the court of appeals found that the district 
court had erred in granting summary judgement against the city 
with regard to the race and disability aspects of the program, but 
120. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
121. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1000-01. 
122. Id. at 1001. 
123. Id. 
124. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
125. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). 
126. Contractor's Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001 (citing More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n.4 (8th 
Cir. 1993». 
127. More, 984 F.2d 269. See also Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001. 
128. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. §12101 (1990). 
129. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); infra Part II.C. 
130. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001. 
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that it had correctly dismissed the gender preference.131 At the 
summary judgement stage, the city of Philadelphia had presented 
detailed statistical and anecdotal evidence regarding the race-based 
aspects of the program,132 virtually no evidence in regard to the 
gender based aspects,133 and simply anecdotal evidence for the 
disability based aspects of the program.l34 
Thus in Contractors Association, the racial preference was 
subjected to the greatest scrutiny, and the nature and level of 
evidence required was significant.135 By contrast, the disability 
preference was barely scrutinized and survived the equal protection 
analysis with minimal evidence.136 Moreover, while the court 
struck down the gender preference, it did hold that: "Logically a 
city must be able to rely on less evidence in enacting a gender 
preference than a racial preference because applying Croson's 
evidentiary standard to a gender preference would eviscerate the 
difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny."I37 Thus, 
while the race based portion of the program in Contractors 
Association survived summary judgment, it is apparent that the 
evidentiary hurdles required to do so are significant and make it 
much harder to defend the race based portions of a program than 
those based on gender or disability. 
In another case, Coral Construction Co. v. King County,l38 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a challenge to King 
County, Washington's minority and womens' business enterprise 
set-aside program.139 The district court had granted the county's 
motion for summary judgement.l40 However, the Court of 
Appeals reversed as to the race-based aspects of the program, 
holding that strict scrutiny requires detailed statistical proof in 
addition to the strong anecdotal evidence that King County had 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 1002-08. 
133. [d. at 1009-11. 
134. [d. at 1011-12. On remand, the district court invalidated the race based aspects of 
the program under strict scrutiny analysis. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 893 F. 
Supp. 419 (E.O. Pa 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996). 
135. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1009. 
136. [d. at 1011-12. 
137. [d. at 1010. 
138. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991). 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 915. See also Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.O. Wash. 
1989). 
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presented,141 and that the program was not narrowly tailored 
because it was ge.ographically overbroad.142 
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit upheld the gender based 
preference under intermediate scrutiny,143 noting that "[u]nlike 
the strict standard of review applied to race-conscious programs, 
intermediate scrutiny does not require any showing of govern-
mental involvement, active or passive, in the discrimination it seeks 
to remedy."l44 In upholding the gender based preference, the 
court relied heavily on the type of anecdotal evidence considered 
inadequate to support the race-based set-aside.145 
In a third case, Concrete Works of Colorado v. City & County 
of Denver,l46 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a 
Denver ordinance which provided a preference for minority and 
women's businesses.147 The district court had granted Denver's 
motion for summary judgement and Concrete Works of Colorado 
appealed.l48 The Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny to the 
race-based aspects of the program and intermediate scrutiny to the 
gender-based aspects.149 However, after completing a detailed 
examination of the evidence required by Croson, the court found 
that Denver's evidence in support of the program raised issues of 
material fact and thus summary judgment should not have been 
granted.l50 The court acknowledged that Denver had compiled 
"substantial evidence" that was "particularized and geographically 
targeted. ,,151 
The Tenth Circuit in Concrete Works did not differentiate its 
analysis as between the race and gender aspects of Denver's 
141. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 916-22. King County had produced statistical proof 
for the district court in the form of two detailed studies. However, the district court did not 
consider that evidence in granting summary judgement because it was presented a few days 
before the motions were heard. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this evidence 
could be sufficient, but further held that the Coral Construction Company should have an 
opportunity to refute that statistical evidence because "statistics are not irrefutable, and may 
be rebutted." Id. at 921. 
142. Id. at 925-26. 
143. Id. at 928-33. 
144. Id. at 932. 
145. Id. at 933. 
146. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994). 
147. Id. at 1515-17. 
148. Id. at 1515, 1517. 
149. Id. at 1519. 
150. Id. at 1519-30. 
151. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1530. 
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program;152 the court seemed to require the same evidence in 
support of both. Thus, when the evidence was held to be insuffi-
cient, it was held to be insufficient for both the race and gender 
aspects of the program.153 No explanation exists as to why the 
court proceeded in this manner, but given that the court was 
primarily concerned with plaintiff's challenge to the accuracy of 
Denver's data in light of the strict evidentiary standard set forth in 
Croson,l54 the court may simply have believed that an appeal 
from a grant of summary judgment did not present an appropriate 
opportunity to hold such evidence sufficient under either stan-
dard.155 
Finally, in Associated General Contractors of California v. City 
& County of San Francisco/56 a pre-Croson case, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied intermediate scrutiny and held the 
gender-based aspects of a San Francisco ordinance providing 
preferences for minority and women owned businesses to be 
facially valid.157 The court then proceeded to strike down the 
preference favoring minority owned businesses under a strict 
scrutiny standard.15s 
However, citing Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke/59 United States v. Paradise1(IJ and Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson School Board,161 the court 
stated that it was not applying the "old strict scrutiny that was 
'strict' in theory but fatal in fact.,,162 Instead, the court applied 
a form of strict scrutiny that resembles what would become the 
AdarandiCroson version of strict scrutiny.l63 Yet, in upholding 
the gender preference while at the same time striking down the 
152. Ill. 
153. Ill. 
154. Ill. 
155. See ill. at 1531 (implying that appeal from summary judgement did not provide an 
appropriate opportunity). 
156. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
157. Id. at 939-42. Some aspects of the program as a whole were struck down as violative 
of the city charter. Ill. at 924-28. It is the aspects of the program that survived examination 
of the city charter which were subjected to the equal protection analysis. Id. 
158. Id. at 928-39. 
159. 159. See 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun 
11.). 
160. 480 U.S. 149 (1987)(plurality opinion). 
161. 476 U.S. 267 (1986)( O'Connor, J., concurring). 
162. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 928. 
163. Id. 
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racial preference, the court acknowledged that intermediate 
scrutiny is still more permissive than strict scrutiny.l64 
These four cases demonstrate that the application of strict 
scrutiny to all racial classifications (whether invidious or benign), 
does not result in consistent analysis of affirmative action programs 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The vertical anomaly created 
by AdarandiCroson is apparent in cases like Contractors Associa-
tion,l65 and Coral Const. Co. 166 Even cases like Concrete 
Works,167 where the court utilizes different levels of scrutiny for 
different classes but continues to analyze the evidence from a strict 
scrutiny perspective, are problematic. Concrete Works is especially 
troubling because the court provides no rationale for its ap-
proach.l68 Furthermore, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged in Contractors Association: "logically, a city must be 
able to rely on less evidence in enacting a gender preference than 
a racial preference because applying Croson's [and Adarand's] 
evidentiary standard to a gender preference would eviscerate the 
difference between strict and intermediate scrutiny.,,169 
Perhaps the district court in Contractors Association summed 
up this vertical anomaly best when it noted that while the tiered 
scrutiny works as intended when invidious discrimination is 
involved, those same tiers, when applied to affirmative action 
create an anomaly which makes it harder to remedy race discrimi-
nation than sex discrimination even though blacks "as a class" have 
been subjected to the most "egregious discrimination.,,170 The 
164. ld. at 941-42. 
165. See supra notes 115-137 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 146-155 and accompanying text. 
168. ld. 
169. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1010. 
170. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274,1302-1303 (E.D. Pa. 
1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993), on remand, 893 F. Supp. 419 
(E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996). The district court captured the essence of 
the vertical anomaly: 
[T]he use of intermediate scrutiny to analyze gender-based classifications in 
the affirmative action context produces an anomalous result. In the non-
affirmative action context the use of a three-tiered analysis for ordinances 
disadvantaging blacks, women or non-suspect classifications creates the result 
intended by the Supreme Court-it is most difficult to uphold a classification 
disadvantaging blacks, less difficult to uphold a classification disadvantaging 
women, and easiest to uphold a classification disadvantaging a non-suspect class. 
However, in the affirmative action setting the use of this three-tiered scheme 
means that laws disadvantaging whites (MBEs) will be held to a stricter standard 
HeinOnline -- 101 Dick. L. Rev. 307 1996-1997
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS 307 
district court questioned whether this approach was the intended 
result of Croson. If it was, the court questioned the logic of that 
result.l7l 
Another option to avoid the vertical anomaly would be to 
apply strict scrutiny to all ~enign measures while leaving the tiers 
otherwise intact.172 Several courts have already utilized this 
approach when examining programs involving gender and race.173 
This approach, however, creates yet another anomaly. 
B. The Second Option: Subjecting All Affirmative Action to 
Strict Scrutiny While Maintaining the Current Three Tiered 
Scheme for Invidious Discrimination-The Creation of 
Horizontal Anomalies 
One way to solve the problem of vertical anomaly is to subject 
all government created affirmative action programs to the same 
level of scrutiny. Under the current scheme developed by the 
AdarandlCroson holdings, that level of scrutiny would be strict 
scrutiny.174 Under AdarandlCroson race-based affirmative action 
than laws disadvantaging men (FBEs). The flip-side of this is that under the 
sliding scale analysis, it becomes easier for a state legislature or a city council to 
pass an FBE than an MBE, because the former will be held to a lesser standard 
of scrutiny by the courts. 
This court questions whether this result was intended. The anomaly lies in 
the fact that the three-tiered scheme sprung from the judicial determination that, 
as a class blacks have been subjected to the most egregious discrimination over 
time. (Citation omitted) ... The very existence of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution evinces a Congressional intent to 
give itself the power to redress past discrimination against blacks. (Footnote 
omitted). 
However, a look at Supreme Court decisions holding that laws disadvan-
taging blacks and whites should be held to the same strict standard, see Croson, 
supra, and that laws disadvantaging women and men should be held to the same 
intermediate standard, see Craig v. Boren, supra, may explain or justify this 
anomalous result. Perhaps by determining that discrimination against whites and 
discrimination against blacks is equally abhorrent and that the criteria of race is 
"more suspect" than gender discrimination, the Supreme Court has accepted the 
result that it is now more difficult to remedy race discrimination than sex 
discrimination. Whether it has or not, this court questions the logic of such a 
result. 
Id. at 1302-03. Although the case was partially reversed on appeal, the above language was 
not questioned on appeal. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990. See also notes 115-37 and 
accompanying text. 
171. Contractors Ass'n, 735 F. Supp. at 1302-03. 
172. See infra Part II.B. 
173. Id. 
174. See generally, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
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has to be subject to strict sCrutiny.17S Thus, in order to get rid of 
the vertical anomaly, strict scrutiny would have to apply to the 
other groups included in affirmative action programs unless 
AdarandiCroson were overtumed.176 However, this option is 
problematic since, under the current three tiered scheme, invidious 
classifications based on gender and disability are subject to levels 
of scrutiny that are lower than strict scrutiny. In This creates the 
"horizontal anomaly" depicted in figure 3. 
Race 
(Strict Scrutiny) 
Gender 
(Intermediate Scrutiny) 
Disability 
(Rational Basis Scrutiny) 
More Protection From 
Invidious Discrimination 
t Invidious <--------> Benign-Race 
I consistency Benign-Gender 
I (Race Only) Benign-Disability 
I Invidious <-----------------> 
I inconsistency 
I Invidious <----------> 
I inconsistency 
I 
.J. 
Easier to Enact 
Remedial Legislation 
FIGURE 3 
This option, to subject all benign classifications to strict 
scrutiny, may seem too illogical for anyone to actually consider 
using in equal protection analysis. Essentially this option would 
make it easier to perpetrate invidious discrimination based on 
gender and disability than to enact benign measures meant to 
remedy the effects of discrimination. Since Croson, however, some 
courts have done exactly that. 
In Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County,178 Conlin v. 
Blanchard,179 and American Subcontractors Association v. City of 
Atlanta,lf!iJ strict scrutiny was applied to both race and gender 
based affirmative action programs. However, the courts in these 
three cases did not provide any explanation as to why strict scrutiny 
175. See generally, Adarand, 115 S. a. 2097; Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
176. For discussion of the possibility of overturning Adarand and Croson, see infra Part 
II.D. 
177. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; 
Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001. 
178. 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990). It is significant that Cone Corp. held that both 
preferences (race and gender) could survive strict scrutiny. [d. 
179. 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989). 
180. 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989). 
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was applied to the gender aspects of the programs. lSI Nor did the 
opinions cite any language from Croson which would support 
application of strict scrutiny to gender.l82 Significantly, every 
court that has explained its choice of scrutiny levels in this context 
has applied levels of scrutiny lower than strict scrutiny to gender or 
disability based preferences.l83 Sometimes, however, those courts 
have bemoaned the vertical anomaly thus created.l84 
The essence of the horizontal anomaly created by exercise of 
this option, as demonstrated in the cases that have utilized it, is the 
fact that the option fails to address the level of scrutiny to be 
applied to invidious discrimination based on gender and disability. 
This failure would seem to violate the concept of "consistency" as 
set forth in Adarand,l85 since consistency requires that the stan-
dard applied not be dependant upon the group benefitted or 
burdened by a classification.l86 However, since Adarand specifi-
cally dealt with race, it is possible that "consistency" as defined in 
Adarand is limited to race thus supporting this result. Of course, 
this explanation still leaves the anomalous result shown in Figure 
3-it would be harder to justify the enactment of benign measures 
aimed at remedying the effects of discrimination based on gender 
or disability than it would be to perpetuate intentional discri-
mination. Such a result makes little sense even in the ahistorical, 
decontextualized world of Adarand.l!f7 Thus, in solving the 
vertical anomaly, this option creates a horizontal anomaly; a result 
which is unacceptable based on the concept of "consistency" and 
on simple logic. 
C. The Third Option: Strict Scrutiny for Benign and Invidious 
Classifications 
One way to solve both the vertical and horizontal anomalies 
examined above is to subject all classes traditionally included in 
government developed affirmative action programs to strict 
scrutiny, both for invidious and benign classifications. This option, 
181. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001. 
182. [d. 
183. See supra Part II.A. and cases cited therein. 
184. Contractors Ass'n. 735 F. Supp. at 1302-03. 
185. Adarand. 115 S. Q. at 2111. This concept was also inherent in the Croson holding. 
See generally Croson. 488 U.S. 469. 
186. Adarand. 115 S. Q. at 2111. 
187. See supra notes 5 and 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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however, is similarly fraught with difficulty. Fortunately, as will be 
explained in this Part,I88 the Adarand Court might actually have 
provided the solution to those difficulties, albeit unintentionally. 
Exercise of this option leads to the result depicted in Figure 4 as 
discussed in this Part. 
More Flexible Strict Scrutiny 
Invidious <-----------------> Benign 
(Race, Gender, Disability) consistency (Race, Gender, Disability) 
FIGURE 4 
The primary concern raised by this option is based on the 
recognition that gender and disability, two of the three groups 
commonly included in affirmative action programs, are not consid-
ered suspect classes for purposes of strict scrutiny analysis.I89 
Gender is a quasi-suspect class,I90 and disability is a non-suspect 
class.191 Under current jurisprudence, only classifications based 
on race, alienage and national origin are considered "suspect" and 
are thus subject to strict scrutiny.I92 
The other concern raised by this option is the possibility that 
the floodgates to heightened scrutiny could be opened. This would 
depend, in part, on how affirmative action is defined under this 
option. For example, many social services programs could arguably 
be considered a form of affirmative action for certain classes like 
children or the poor. Would application of this third option subject 
188. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text_ 
189. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 999-1001. 
190. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying a heightened scrutiny to a gender 
classification). 
191. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001. 
192. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. 
HeinOnline -- 101 Dick. L. Rev. 311 1996-1997
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS 311 
the classifications created in social service programs to strict 
scrutiny?193 Both of these concerns will be addressed below. 
I wish to be clear at the outset that this discussion is not meant 
to resolve or provide an in-depth examination of the issues raised 
by applying strict scrutiny to gender and disability. Scholars and 
judges have spent much time debating these complex issues; an in-
depth analysis is thus beyond the scope of this article as is any 
speculation on whether the current Court would adopt this option. 
The discussion presented in this article focuses instead on the way 
in which Adarand's vision of strict scrutiny may have added a new 
perspective to this debate, and may have provided the current 
Court, or some future one, a means with which to implement this 
option. As this Part explains, in light of Adarand, application of 
this option is supportable and would provide greater consistency. 
The answer to the first concern set forth above may actually 
lie in the way in which Adarand and Croson define strict scrutiny. 
A major factor preventing gender and disability from being 
considered "suspect classes" (thus subjecting measures which 
discriminate based on those classifications to strict scrutiny) is the 
fact that in some circumstances gender and disability are relevant 
considerations.194 This reality was highly problematic in the 
193. Another possible concern with characterizing gender and disability as suspect classes 
is that the concept of equal protection was primarily developed in relation to the oppression 
of African-Americans. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Galotto, supra 
note IS, at 536. In Croson, however, the Court ignored the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, holding that it afforded the same protection to whites as to blacks. 
Croson, 488 U.S. 469. Thus, the court seemed to be moving towards "a broader notion of 
the Equal Protection Clause as an egalitarian principle." See Galatto, supra note IS, at 536 
(concluding that this "broadening of equal protection to include whites, however, unwittingly 
includes gender groups"). Applying Adarand's concept of "congruence," Adarand, 115 S. 
a. at 2111, the same would apparently apply to the equal protection aspects inherent in the 
Fifth Amendment. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. See also, supra notes 50-55 and 
accompanying text. 
Of course, the simple fact that the Court applies equal protection principles to groups 
other than African-Americans, albeit with a lower level of scrutiny, also demonstrates this, 
as does the application of strict scrutiny to alienage and national origin. 
194. See supra notes 107, 112-13 and accompanying text. Ironically, in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), a plurality of the Court applied strict 
scrutiny to a gender classification, noting that what makes gender (as opposed to 
characteristics like intelligence or physical disability) more similar to suspect classifications, 
is that gender is so rarely relevant to the ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. at 
686-87. Ultimately, however, Frontiero would not govern treatment of gender classifications 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps because of a fear that women would be drafted 
or that single sex bathrooms and locker rooms would be imposed, the relevant differences 
between the sexes precluded the universal application of strict scrutiny, which at the time was 
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context of applying strict scrutiny, when that level of scrutiny was 
considered "fatal in fact. ,,195 However, under the 
AdarandiCroson vision of strict scrutiny,196 which appears more 
flexible than earlier conceptions of that standard,197 such dif-
ferences can simply be considered relevant factors in analyzing 
gender and disability based classifications under strict scrutiny.198 
In fact, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Adarand majority, 
specifically states in response to Justice Stevens: 
He [Justice Stevens] also allows that nothing is inherently wrong 
with applying a single standard to fundamentally different 
situations, as long as that standard takes relevant differences 
into account. ... What he fails to recognize is that strict 
scrutiny does take "relevant differences" into account-indeed, 
that is its fundamental purpose.l99 
Of course, the relevance of the characteristic/classification to 
legislative decision making is not the only factor which the 
Supreme Court has utilized to define which groups should be 
considered "suspect" for equal protection purposes. Other factors 
important to such a determination are whether the classification is 
based on an "immutable characteristic," or a highly visible trait; 
whether the classification has been a basis for historical oppression; 
and whether the classified group is a discrete and insular minority 
in regard to political representation.200 
Gender is undoubtedly an immutable characteristic. One is 
born with and cannot change one's gender. without undergoing 
major surgery. Gender is also highly visible; one can generally tell 
immediately the gender of an individual upon seeing her or him 
"fatal in fact." Galotto, supra note 15, at 521-22. Thus, the intermediate scrutiny standard 
essentially embodies the reality that gender may sometimes be relevant. Id. See also City 
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. The fact that Frontiero draws a distinction between gender 
and disability is not problematic to the argument favoring the application of heightened 
scrutiny to disability, in light of the change in perception and legislative treatment regarding 
disability since the early 1970s. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text. 
195. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). See also Gerald 
Cunther, The Supreme Coun, 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Coun: A Model For Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1972). 
196. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-11. 
197. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-11. 
198. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. 
199. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (citations omitted). 
200. Frontiero,411 U.S. 677 (plurality opinion); See also Galotto, supra note 15, at 519-21. 
The term "discrete and insular minority," was coined in the famous footnote 4 from United 
States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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and can often determine gender from voice alone. The latter two 
factors (i.e. basis of historical oppression and discrete and insular 
minority) are arguably more problematic in the context of classify-
ing gender. Yet, even after the Court repudiated its decision to 
apply strict scrutiny to gender in Frontiero v. Richardson,wI a case 
where the Court also held that women have been subject to 
historical oppression in this nation and are a "discrete and insular 
minority,,,202 many courts have continued to acknowledge the 
serious discrimination that women face in society while applying 
the intermediate scrutiny standard.203 
Likewise, disability is an immutable characteristic. One 
generally cannot change the fact that he or she is disabled absent 
some sort of cure or significant treatment. If the disabled indi-
vidual were cured, or the disabling effects of the condition totally 
alleviated through treatment, then the individual would no longer 
be disabled and would not be entitled to receive the same level of 
scrutiny. Additionally, disability is frequently highly visible. Of 
course, this is not always the case; it may be impossible to deter-
mine visually whether someone has a particular disability such as 
epilepsy or cancer. However, since characteristics such as alienage 
and national origin which are not always highly visible are afforded 
strict scrutiny,204 the visibility factor alone is apparently not 
dispositive on the issue of equal protection classification. 
As with gender, it is the last two factors (i.e. basis of historical 
oppression and discrete and insular minority) that are most 
problematic in the context of classifying disability. In City of 
Cleburne,205 the Court rejected arguments that the mentally 
retarded have been subject to a history of oppression or relegated 
to a position of political powerlessness sufficient to meet these two 
factors.206 Since City of Cleburne, however, Congress passed the 
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA,,).207 Among the 
201. 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
202. [d. at 684-87. 
203. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 93942. 
204. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classification based on alienage); City 
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (classifications based on race, alienage or national origin receive 
strict scrutiny). 
205. 473 U.S. at 432. 
206. [d. at 442-47. 
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). 
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Congressional findings incorporated into the ADA are the following: 
(2) [H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and 
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities continue to be serious and pervasive social 
problems; ... 
(6) [C]ensus data, national polls, and other studies have 
documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an 
inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged 
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; ... 
(7) [J]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular 
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, 
subjected to a history of purposeful and unequal treatment, and 
relegated to a position political powerlessness in our society, 
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such 
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly 
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to partici-
pate in, and contribute to, society; ... 208 
The language that Congress utilized in the ADA is virtually 
identical to the language typically associated with suspect classifica-
tions.209 Such treatment of a class by Congress, although not 
dispositive, is certainly relevant to the status of the class within the 
tiered equal protection analytical framework.21o The few cases 
which have held that the ADA does not alter the standard set forth 
in City of Cleburne have done so with only a cursory explanation 
and without analyzing the rather clear language of the statute.211 
Additionally, the form of strict scrutiny espoused in Adarand 
and Croson lends itself better to analysis of a broad class of 
individuals since that standard takes relevant differences into 
account.212 For example, a law requiring that individuals be able 
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2),(6) and (7) (emphasis added). 
209. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 440-47; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; United States v. 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
210. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687-88 (concluding, based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
that "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently 
invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of government is not without significance 
... "); Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966). 
211. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001; More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n.4 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
212. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. 
HeinOnline -- 101 Dick. L. Rev. 315 1996-1997
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ADARAND CONSTRUcrORS 315 
to see in order to obtain a driver's license is likely to survive this 
kind of strict scrutiny.213 
Disability itself is a diverse and broad characteristic, and an in 
depth analysis of how best to analyze disability under strict scrutiny 
is beyond the scope of this article. However, since strict scrutiny 
now considers relevant differences, and can supposedly weed out 
valid from invalid legislative purposes,214 this view of strict 
scrutiny can itself accommodate some of the technical problems 
resulting from its application to disability. 
Thus, a primary factor preventing gender and disability from 
being considered "suspect" for strict scrutiny purposes is that those 
classifications are relevant more frequently than race (although in 
regard to gender, this is rarely so). Justice O'Connor's version of 
strict scrutiny in Adarand seems to vitiate this concern since its 
very purpose "is to account for relevant differences.,,215 This does 
not mean that the Court will necessarily find gender and disability 
to be discrete and insular minorities subject to a history of 
oppression, but it does suggest that recent developments could 
support such a holding. 
The second concern regarding the application of strict scrutiny 
to gender and disability, that this could open the floodgates to 
increased use of strict scrutiny, is essentially solved by the above 
analysis.216 Those classifications involve immutable characteristics 
and possess the other traits (i.e. basis of historical oppression and 
discrete and insular minority) which support suspect classification. 
Most other classes do not.217 
Since, opting not to apply strict scrutiny to invidious and 
benign gender and disability based measures creates horizontal or 
vertical anomalies and potentially threatens the Court's vision of 
213. However, a similar law based on the race of an applicant for a driver's license could 
never be upheld under the strict scrutiny espoused in Adarand. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
214. Id. at 2113. 
215. Id. 
216. In fact, this fear was one of the primary concerns in the City of Cleburne decision. 
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432. 
217. For example, one might say that the elderly are not a discrete and insular minority 
who as a group have faced a history of oppression. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that the elderly are not a suspect class). 
Of course, if appropriate evidence could support the application of strict scrutiny to the 
elderly, or any other group, perhaps the Court would apply strict scrutiny to such a group. 
However, few group classifications are likely to gamer the level of evidence which supports 
the application of strict scrutiny to gender and disability. 
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"consistency," application of Adarand's more forgiving formulation 
of strict scrutiny is the best solution short of overturning Adarand 
and potentially Croson. Thus while this third option as discussed 
in this Part is not the only remaining option,21S it is a consistent 
and supportable approach to analyzing affirmative action programs 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
D. The Fourth Option: Overturning Adarand, Perhaps the Best 
Option of All? 
The fourth and final option is to overturn Adarand. Since 
Adarand's approach is at the core of the anomalies discussed 
above,219 exercise of this option could also prevent both the 
vertical and horizontal anomalies. Significantly, Adarand itself 
provides the rope with which it can be hung. 
As was pointed out earlier in this article, the three concepts 
underlying the Adarand decision are problematic.220 Skepticism 
by itself is not inconsistent with a lower level of scrutiny, but it is 
problematic when combined with the other two concepts of 
consistency and congruence. "Consistency" creates major inconsis-
tencies when classifications other than race are considered.221 
Furthermore, the concept of consistency requires an ahistorical, 
decontextualized approach to issues arising specifically in and from 
a historical and social context.222 Ironically, it is the third con-
cept, congruence, which can act as a key to overturning the 
Adarand decision itself. 
Interestingly, the Adarand court engaged in a detailed analysis 
of the principle of stare decisis in order to conclude that it was 
appropriate to overturn Metro Broadcasting.2'23 The Court essen-
tially held that Metro Broadcasting was an aberration which signi-
ficantly departed from an "intrinsically sounder" doctrine as 
established in prior cases.224 Citing Justice Frankfurter's discus-
sion of stare decisis in Helvering v. Hallock,225 the Court deter-
218. See infra Parts ILA.; II.B. and 11.0. 
219. See supra Parts ILA. and II.B. 
220. See supra Part L 
221. See supra Parts ILA and ILB. 
222. See supra Part L 
223. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17. 
224. [d. at 2114-15. 
225. 309 U.S. 106 (1940). The Court refers to Justice Frankfurter's admonition regarding 
stare decisis set forth in Helvering. [d. Justice Frankfurter declared that stare decisis 
involves more than simply adhering to the most recent decision when such adherence goes 
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mined that Metro Broadcasting departed from the three principles 
underlying Adarand. In so ruling, the Court explained that those 
principles had been consistently applied for over fifty years.226 
However, as was previously explained,227 the Adarand 
Court's concept of "congruence" was itself a significant departure 
from established precedent.228 Metro Broadcasting, Croson, 
Fullilove and a long line of cases prior to Adarand had established 
that there is an inherent difference between Congress' power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the states' role as bound 
by that Amendment.229 Justice Stevens, in his Adarand dissent, 
summarizes the Majority's departure: 
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the 
same time it expressly limits the states. This is no accident. It 
represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experi-
ence throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the 
Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial 
minorities against the states, some of which may be inclined to 
oppress such minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ignores 
a purposeful "incongruity" so fundamental to our system of 
government is unacceptable.230 
Similarly, Adarand's application of strict scrutiny and use of 
the "consistency" concept are themselves inconsistent with the only 
precedent to deal with federal affirmative action programs, Metro 
Broadcasting and Fullilove. Neither of those decisions applied strict 
scrutiny to such programs, nor did they hold that such scrutiny was 
appropriate in the affirmative action context even though strict 
scrutiny was applicable when invidious discrimination was aimed at 
the same racial minorities who were benefitted by the pro-
grams.231 Significantly, without the concept of "congruence," 
cases such as Croson and Wygant which involved local government 
affirmative action programs, would be inapposite since Congress 
against a "prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by 
experience." Adarand, 115 S. a. at 2111-15 (citing Helvering, 309 U.S. at 119). 
226. ld. 
227. See supra Part I. 
228. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
229. ld. 
230. Adarand, 115 S. a. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
231. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's interpretation of 
Fullilove, upon which the Adarand court relies so heavily, implies that strict scrutiny is 
appropriate. Five other Justices, however, did not so hold. See supra notes 33-34 and 
accompanying text. 
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has broader powers than local governments to enact such pro-
grams.232 
It is Adarand, not Metro Broadcasting, which represents the 
significant departure from precedent; a departure which creates 
anomalies that could wreak havoc on the tiered equal protection 
system that Adarand purported to apply. Thus, Adarand can be 
overturned based on the very reasoning that it used to justify its 
own treatment of Metro Broadcasting.233 
Of course, the question would still remain; what to do then? 
Essentially two possibilities arise. Either go back to the equal 
protection doctrine as it stood prior to Adarand (i.e apply the 
standard used in Metro Broadcasting), or, alternatively, apply a 
different standard to affirmative action; one that may operate 
outside the traditional three tiered system. Although I do not 
discuss these options in detail, I would like to provide a few 
observations about their feasibility based on the foregoing discus-
sion of Adarand. 
First, since Metro Broadcasting applied a form of intermediate 
scrutiny to race based affirmative action,234 even if Metro Broad-
casting were to be the law, a vertical anomaly between race and 
gender on the one hand, and disability on the other would still 
exist. However, such an anomaly would not be as severe as that 
created by application of the Adarand approach.235 Moreover, 
the same factors that militate in favor of applying strict scrutiny to 
disability based classifications could support the application of 
intermediate scrutiny to such classifications.236 The findings of 
social and economic disadvantage in regard to disabled individuals 
as set forth in the ADA support the argument that subjecting 
disability based affirmative action to a lower level of scrutiny is 
desirable.237 
232. See supra Part I. 
233. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17. 
234. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547. 
235. See supra Part II.A. 
236. See supra Part II.C. 
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001. However, this approach could 
create a horizontal anomaly if a higher level of scrutiny were applied to invidious 
discrimination based on disability. Significantly, however, such horizontal anomaly seems 
acceptable under Metro Broadcasting, which itself allowed for a similar anomaly in regard 
to race. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547. Such an anomaly makes more sense in the 
Metro Broadcasting context because it would make it easier to remedy discrimination than 
it does to discriminate in the first place. 
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Second, it has been suggested that true tiers in equal protec-
tion analysis really do not exist, and that what the Court really does 
is apply variations of the same standard.238 For example, Justice 
Stevens has implied that a flexible standard of review, grounded in 
rationality, that calls for heightened evidentiary burdens depending 
on the classification involved could provide a realistic and workable 
approach.239 The primary advantage to this type of approach in 
the affirmative action context is that it is contextual and acknowl-
edges history. 
This type of approach could be effectuated through a "rational 
basis with teeth" approach. In other words, a rational basis 
approach which requires a more detailed examination of evidence 
and context. It would be logical to place affirmative action 
programs in the rational basis tier since doing so would eradicate 
all vertical anomalies in regard to affirmative action, and the 
resulting horizontal anomalies make more sense in the affirmative 
action context. Additionally, application ·of the rational basis test 
need not lead to predetermined results. As Justice O'Connor has 
acknowledged, even the rigid strict scrutiny test can be flexible.240 
Moreover, at least two Justices in Fullilove applied a test that 
did not utilize the traditional concept of a tiered equal protection 
doctrine.241 Thus, it would not be too great a leap to develop a 
test which would enable courts to analyze government developed 
affirmative action programs consistently with equal protection 
without getting caught in the anomalous morass which is created 
when courts attempt to apply the three tiered scheme. Since the 
Court has consistently struggled to reach a consensus that would 
have a lasting effect under the three tiered equal protection 
scheme,242 developing a new test could be an excellent option. 
Finally, even if Adarand were overturned, Croson would 
remain. Like Adarand, Croson creates the same anomalies, only 
238. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
239. Id. at 211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (seemingly applying a heightened fonn of 
rational basis review). . 
240. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111, 2117. 
241. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
242. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109 (noting that for over eight years, the Court was unable 
to produce a majority on the issue of race-based remedial government action in Bakke, 
Fullilove, and Wygant). How long the AdarandlCroson doctrine will survive is still an open 
question. As this article demonstrates, the problems which arise under the Adarand 
approach could ultimately prompt a later Court to discard or refonnulate' the 
AdarandlCroson doctrine. 
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in regard to state and local affirmative action programs. Adarand 
is most susceptible to being overruled based on its reading of the 
"congruence" concept;243 Croson however, would likely survive 
such action. Yet, since Croson creates the same anomalies as 
Adarand and is subject to some of the same infirmities,244 Croson 
should also be overruled.245 Suffice it to say that if Croson is left 
untouched, courts would be limited to exercising the other options 
outlined above as they struggle to address similar anomalies in 
regard to state and local affirmative action programs.246 
III. Strict Scrutiny As Applied To Affirmative Action Is Not 
Fatal In Fact Under AdarandiCroson 
All of the options set forth in Part II, with the exception of the 
option to overrule Adarand, would require strict scrutiny be applied 
at least to race-based affirmative action.247 Significantly, this does 
not mean that affirmative action programs cannot survive that level 
of scrutiny. Adarand specifically dispelled the notion that strict 
scrutiny is "strict in theory but fatal in fact,,,248 although it would 
appear that strict scrutiny is indeed "fatal in fact" for most 
invidious classifications.249 
Essentially, these options shift the focus from the level of 
scrutiny to the level of evidence required to support a benign 
program. This is exactly what Croson did in regard to state and 
local affirmative action programs.250 Evidence of broad societal 
discrimination is no longer sufficient.251 Evidence of discrimina-
243. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. 
244. Most significantly, the "what's good for the goose, is good for the gander" approach 
(labeled "consistency" in Adarand) leads to vertical anomaly. See infra Part II.A. 
245. Exactly how or why Croson should be overruled is beyond the scope of this article. 
For an excellent discussion of why Croson is a problematic opinion that ultimately should 
not survive, see Rosenfeld, supra note 5; See also Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy 
of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 679 (1995) 
(pointing out inherent weaknesses in the Croson decision and some of the problems applying 
Croson). 
246. See supra Parts II.A., II.B. and II.C. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would have to 
address the constitutionality of option three, if it was adopted. 
247. See supra Part II.A. (strict scrutiny would apply to race); Part II.B. (strict scrutiny 
would apply to all benign measures based on race, gender or disability) and Part II.C. (strict 
scrutiny would apply to all classifications based on race, gender or disability). 
248. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. 
249. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that she reads the opinions in 
Adarand to mean a Korematsu-type invidious classification will never again survive scrutiny). 
250. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
251. Id. at 486-93. 
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tion by the governmental entity involved, whether active or passive, 
is apparently required.252 
Significantly, after Croson, several federal appellate courts 
have held that programs could survive strict scrutiny.253 While 
most of these cases were appealed after a grant of summary 
judgement, and thus only held that an issue of material fact existed 
as to the validity of the programs involved,254 each of these courts 
acknowledged that sufficient evidence could be present in those 
cases,255 and at least one court was quite specific about the type 
of evidence required to meet strict scrutiny.256 The key is that the 
Adarand Court, like the Court in Croson, specifically acknowledged 
that some benign measures could survive strict scrutiny.257 
Therefore, Congress and state legislatures alike can craft 
benign race, gender and disability based measures which are 
constitutional as long as these programs are supported by appro-
priate data. Unfortunately, like Croson, the Adarand decision is 
not very clear about what type of evidence is required to meet this 
test.258 Perhaps the best guidance for courts grappling with this 
evidentiary morass will come from cases like Concrete Work?9 
and Contractors Association2fIJ which seek to interpret the eviden-
tiary burdens set forth in Croson. Significantly, these cases 
252. lei at 493. Whether this will ultimately be required for Congressional action was not 
clearly addressed in Adarand. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097. 
253. See generally Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990; Coral Const. Co., 941 F.2d 910; Cone 
Corp., 908 F.2d 908. Ultimately, however, at least in Contractors Ass'n, the program was 
struck down. See Contractors Ass'n, 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d 
Cir.1996). 
254. Contractor's Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1012; Coral Const. Co., 941 F.2d at 933; Cone Corp., 
908 F.2d at 917. 
255. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1010·11; Coral Const. CO.,941 F.2d at 930·33; Cone 
Corp., 908 F.2d at 912·17. 
256. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1001·09. Though, as noted supra at note 253, on 
remand it was determined the race based aspects of the program in question did not meet 
this level of scrutiny. See also Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1519·30 (also giving a detailed 
analysis of the nature of evidence required to meet strict scrutiny after Croson). 
257. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113·14, 2117. See also Kathryn Lee, Note, Surviving Strict 
Scrutiny: Upholding Federal Affirmative Action After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
44 BUFF. L. REV. 929 (1996) (discussing why federal affirmative action programs can survive 
strict scrutiny as spelled out in Adarand). 
258. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117·18; See also Duncan, supra note 246 (noting the 
uncertainty as to the exact evidentiary standards required to meet the strict scrutiny test set 
forth in Croson). 
259. 36 F.3d 1513. 
260. 6 F.3d 990. 
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acknowledge that programs can survive strict scrutiny if they are 
supported by proper evidence.261 
Moreover, the necessary evidence can be post-enactment 
evidence; even if such evidence was not in existence when a 
program was initiated, a government entity can still utilize it to 
support the program against constitutional challenge.262 Thus, 
even if evidence adequate to meet the evidentiary burden associa-
ted with strict scrutiny was not utilized when creating the federal 
programs, these programs need not be repealed in light of Adarand 
so long as the government can produce such evidence in response 
to a constitutional challenge. Of course, use of post-enactment 
evidence might become less acceptable as the passage of time gives 
the government an opportunity to respond to Adarand and Croson. 
Given the great deal of evidence that discrimination is socially 
embedded in our nation,263 it is unfortunate that the Court has 
required such a costly evidentiary burden. Still, while compiling 
the studies and statistical analysis apparently required by 
CrosoniAdarand will be costly, the burden can be met.264 What 
is less clear after Adarand is how the fact that Congress, unlike 
local legislatures, is not geographically limited in its ability to pass 
legislation in this country will play into the nature of the evidence 
required to support a federal program. Nor is it clear what role 
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment 
might play in assessing, under the strict scrutiny standard, the 
validity of any remedial measures that it passes. It is possible that 
the Court envisions a scenario where Congress has more latitude 
in regard to aspects of the evidentiary burden linked to strict 
scrutiny.265 Unfortunately, the Adarand Court is not very clear 
on this issue.266 
1\vo statements from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand, 
however, demonstrate that government developed affirmative 
action is not yet dead: 
261. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; See also Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990. 
262. See generally Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513; Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d 990. 
263. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 60; Lawrence supra note 60. See also, supra note 
60 and accompanying text. 
264. See generally Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513. 
265. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
266. Adarand, 115 S. Q. 2097. This is another problem created by the Court's concept 
of congruence-Leo exactly how much congruity is required? Furthermore, does not any 
difference in the level of congruence vitiate the entire concept as speUed out by the Court? 
See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact." (Citation omitted). The unhappy 
persistence of both the practice and lingering effects of racial 
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an 
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from 
acting in response to it;267 [and,] 
When race-based action is necessary to further a compel- . 
ling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it 
satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this court has set out in 
previous cases,268 
Thus, if option three as proposed in this article (i.e. strict 
scrutiny for benign and invidious classifications) were utilized,269 
it is possible that gender and disability would receive strict scrutiny 
along with race, but that benign measures based on all of those 
classifications could survive constitutional scrutiny. Regardless of 
which option is ultimately chosen, strict scrutiny as applied to 
benign measures is no longer "fatal in fact.,,27o 
IV. Conclusion 
The Adarand decision, like Croson before it, created a great 
deal of confusion in its quest for consistency. While some of that 
confusion is tied to inconsistencies within the decision itself, and to 
the lack of clear guidance regarding the evidence required to 
survive the now survivable strict scrutiny test, the greatest confu-
sion is likely to arise from the chaotic anomalies which now exist 
within the tiered equal protection system when affirmative action 
programs based on gender and disability are added to the mix. 
These anomalies, combined with the lack of a clear evidentiary 
standard for analyzing affirmative action under strict scrutiny will 
likely lead to a confusion that will dwarf the confusion created by 
earlier decisions in this area. Whether the court intended this 
result is unclear. What is clear, however, is that courts dealing with 
the plethora of affirmative action programs based on race, gender 
and disability, legislatures attempting to enact measures that deal 
with the effects of discrimination in our society, and the individuals 
267. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. 
268. Id. 
269. See supra Part II.C (strict scrutiny would apply to all classifications based on race, 
gender or disability). 
270. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. 
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affected by that discrimination will be left to clean up and pay the 
price for the mess. 
